In 1991, Chang and Wu proposed a broadcasting cryptosystem using interpolating polynomials and geometric properties of circles. Nevertheless, the Chang-Wu scheme can be further enforced by using a time-variant parameter and a one-way function to protect legal receivers' secrets from being disclosed. The authors present an improvement of the Chang-Wu scheme using geometric properties of lines. This improvement repairs the security flaws inherent in the original Chang-Wu scheme, whde requiring fewer public parameters and less computing time.
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In 1991, Chang and Wu proposed a broadcasting cryptosystem using interpolating polynomials and geometric properties of circles. Nevertheless, the Chang-Wu scheme can be further enforced by using a time-variant parameter and a one-way function to protect legal receivers' secrets from being disclosed. The authors present an improvement of the Chang-Wu scheme using geometric properties of lines. This improvement repairs the security flaws inherent in the original Chang-Wu scheme, whde requiring fewer public parameters and less computing time.
Introduction: A broadcasting cryptosystem is used to achieve secure communications over an insecure channel so that only the specified subset of users can obtain the message in one single broadcasting transaction. In 1991, Chang and Wu [I] proposed a broadcasting cryptosystem using interpolating polynomials and geometric properties of circles. Recently, Hwang et al. [2] and Lin and Chen [3] separately demonstrated a successful attack on the Chang-Wu scheme, and showed that in the Chang-Wu scheme, any malicious user who is a legal receiver of a broadcasting transaction can derive the originator's and all other legal receivers' secrets by plotting another legal broadcasting transaction to these users.
In fact, the original Chang-Wu scheme can be further enforced by using a time-variant parameter and a one-way function to protect legal receivers' secrets from being disclosed. In this Letter, we shall present an improvement of the Chang-Wu scheme using geometric properties of lines. Our improvement repairs the security flaws inherent in the original Chang-Wu scheme, while requiring fewer public parameters and less computing time as compared to the enforced Chang-Wu scheme. from EP, which are also distinct from So, SI, ..., S,.
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After that, U, can initiate a secure broadcasting transaction by performing subsequent tasks:
(vii) Calculate C, passing So, w,, and w,,, and obtain its centre P,.
Randomly choose an integer r and compute k = H(r).
(x) Broadcast r and the ciphertext of M encrypted by k. The graphical result of the above procedure is shown in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1 Graphical result of broadcasting stage in Chang-Wu scheme
Recovery stage: On receiving r and the ciphertext of M broadcast by U,, any legal receiver U, performs the following steps to recover
M:
(i) Calculate C, passing S,, wz, and w,, and obtain its centre P,.
(ii) Reconstruct H(x) with P,, 0,, ..., 0,. Suppose U, is the malicious user who wants to derive U's secret point S, (for i = 1, 2, ..., m). First of all, U, initiates three different broadcasting transactions to the same values of U,. Let C,, C,' and c," be the circles with respect to U, for these three transactions, respectively. After that, U, can easily obtain S, by finding the intersection of C,, Ct' and C,", since all these circles pass S,.
Our improvement: Intuitively, the security flaws inherent in the Chang-Wu scheme can be repaired by using a time-variant parameter and one-way function to protect legal receivers' secret points from being disclosed. Let f be a one-way function that accepts variable-length input and produces a point with x-and y-coordinates in EP. Such a one-way functionfcan easily be built from the methods proposed in [4, 51. Let T be the time-variant parameter. We can replace all secret points S, by AT, S,) in the broadcasting stage of the Chang-Wu scheme. This small modification has sufficient strength to thwart the attacks on the original Chang-Wu scheme. In the following, we describe another improvement of the Chang-Wu scheme using geometric properties of lines.
Initially, CAS randomly chooses @+I) distinct points S, from EP, and distributes Si to U, (for i = 0, 1, ..., n) via secure channels.
Meanwhile, CAS publishes a one-way function f defined above. (ii) Reconstruct L(x) with Q, and A.
(iii) Compute k = L(r) and use it to decrypt the ciphertext. It can be seen that in our improvement, each of the originator and all legal receivers of a secure broadcasting transaction will reconstruct the same line ax) by using the public point A and his own secret point S,. This implies that the originator and all legal receivers of a secure broadcasting transaction share a common session key k = L(r) for establishing a secure channel. Thus, the broadcasting and the recovery stages work correctly.
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Fig. 2 Graphical result of broadcasting stage in our improvement
Security analysis: If an adversary or illegal receiver of a secure broadcasting transaction can reconstruct the line L(x), generated by CAS, from available public information, then he can compute the encryption key k = L(r) and obtain the broadcasting secret message. To attempt a successful attack on reconstructing L(x), except for the public point A , the adversary should find another point located at L(x). For instance, an illegal receiver U, might act as a legal one and compute the midpoint of P, and AT, s,>, denoted as Q:, (for i = 1, 2, ..., m) for reconstructing L(x). We see that the probability of obtaining one Qt* located at L(x) is equivalent to that of performing an exhaustive search on k. Moreover, the lines L(x) and the values of AT, S,) are time-variant. The adversary, being the illegal receiver for the current transaction, still cannot successfully find an extra point that is located at current a x ) , even if he has collected enough historical information from previous transactions for which he was the legal receiver.
Obviously, TH > T, and TH (rl > TL (r) when the degree of H is greater than 1, and Tp : > T, and T, > T,. Table 1 shows the performance of the broadcasting and the recovery stages in our improvement and the enforced Chang-Wu scheme, respectively. From Table 1 , it can be seen that our improvement outperforms the enforced Chang-Wu scheme in both the broadcasting and the recovery stages.
In the broadcasting sitage, our improvement requires publishing m+2 points plus one time-variant parameter, while the enforced Chang-Wu scheme requires publishing 3m+2 public points plus one time-variant parameter. Thus, our improvement needs fewer public parameters to originate secure broadcasting transactions.
Conclusions:
We have presented an improvement of the ChangWu scheme using geomletric properties of lines. Our improvement successfully repairs the security flaws inherent in the original Chang-Wu scheme. All receivers' secrets are protected by using a time-variant parameter and a one-way function. In addition, our improvement gives a better performance and requires fewer public parameters than those of the enforced Chang-Wu scheme. Extended Golay codes possess certain two-level structures which are important far decoding the codes. However, these ideal structures are not limited to Golay codes. Here, the structures are generalised to other linear codes, among which are a binary (20, 9, 7) code, a binaiy (32, 16, 8) code, a binary (40, 20, 8) code and a ternary (18, 9, 6 ) code. Similar to the Golay codes, there are also efficient decoding algorithms for these codes, which are sufficiently simple to enable decoding the derived codes by hand calculations.
Introduction:
The extended Golay codes are certainly among the most interesting codes k n o m , their rich structural properties lead to a number of efficient decoding algorithms. In particular, the Pless constructions of the Golay codes make it possible to decode the codes by hand [l] . The decoding algorithms can also correct some 4 bit error pattenns, which is a special feature of the algorithms. Two very efficient maximum likelihood soft decoders were developed by Vardy and Be'ery for the Golay codes as well [2] . The high efficiency of the decoders is mainly due to the Pless structures of the Golay codes. In fact, the Pless structures are not limited to the Golay codes; in this study, by the Pless construction method, many other linear codes will be constructed from some known linear codes. Similarly, these codes can also be decoded efficiently.
